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Government growth has been a long-standing research issue among public economists as well as 
an important concern of the general public. This paper investigates the impact of government IT 
investments on government growth. Drawing on the literature on public economics, political 
sciences, and IT value, I offer theoretical discussions and four mechanisms as to the relationship 
between IT investments and government expenditures, leading to two competing hypotheses that 
IT investments either expand or shrink the amount of government expenditures. Using data on IT 
investments, state government finances, demography, and other institutional and socio-
economical factors, I test which prediction prevails in the context of U.S. state governments. The 
empirical investigations support the hypothesis that greater IT investments are associated with 
smaller state government size, measured as a ratio of annual total expenditures to state gross 
domestic product. 
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Introduction 
Since the nineteenth century, public economists and political scientists have long been interested in the growth of 
governments (Larkey et al. 1981). Witnessing a significant growth in governments over the recent several decades 
and concomitant frustration of the general public with ‘big governments,’ numerous researchers have studied why 
governments continue to grow. Inquires have examined a variety of questions including which factors cause 
governments to grow; under what mechanisms government expenditures are determined; and what impact 
government growth has upon the overall economy. The literature on this issue is so wide and extensive that Lybeck 
(1988) classified the literature into twelve theories, and Tarschys (1975) suggested nine broad categories and 25 
explanations for government growth, although both authors admitted that their coverage is by no means exhaustive. 
One of the key factors behind government growth identified by this literature is technological development 
(Tarschys 1975, North 1985). Specifically, the industrial revolution fueled by technological advances and 
accompanying societal changes such as urbanization have led governments to increase their influence on the 
economy. Against this backdrop, I propose another technological factor that may influence the growth of 
governments in the post-industrial era – information technology (IT). Considering that IT plays a crucial role in 
transforming many aspects of the economy, be it in the private or public sector, I aim at exploring whether IT 
investments made by governments can change or keep the course of government growth. 
The relationship between IT investments and organization size in the for-profit context is among key research 
interests in the information systems (IS) literature. For example, an industry-level analysis by Brynjolfsson et al. 
(1994) shows that the level of industry IT stock is related to a smaller size of firms as measured by the number of 
employees, sales, and value added per establishment. Also in an industry-level study, Wood et al. (2008) find that 
the relationship varies across industry sectors; IT investments are associated with smaller firm size in manufacturing 
industries and with larger firm size in retail and service industries. One of the few studies at the organizational level, 
Hitt (1999) finds that increased use of IT is associated with an increase in vertical integration and a decrease in 
diversification. However, few studies, if any, in IS and public economics have paid much attention to the effect of IT 
investments on government size. 
To fill this gap, I offer theoretical arguments and empirical evidence regarding the role of IT in government growth 
at the context of U.S. state governments. Drawing on market-based and institutional theories of government 
expenditures, I give four explanations for the impact of IT on government growth. First, on the supply side, 
automating manual, labor-intensive administrative processes enables governments to produce public goods and 
services with a smaller amount of input. In other words, IT improves the productivity of public good production 
(Brynjolfson and Hitt 1996, Dewan and Kraemer 2000). Consequently, IT investments can be expected to lead to 
smaller governments, provided that the demand of public goods remains unchanged. Second, more digitalized, 
transparent administrative processes and increased availability of information on governments’ actions and decision 
making alleviate the information asymmetry problem between principals (voters and legislatures) and agents 
(bureaus) (Horn 1995). This effect can make the monitoring activities of legislatures (Bendor et al. 1985, Banks 
1989) more effective and thereby curb the power of bureaucrats, which may lead to excessive government 
expenditures (Niskanen 1968, Miller and Joe 1983).  
On the demand side, enhanced communication between citizens and government officials promoted by e-
Government initiatives (West 2004) helps citizens and interest groups become well-informed about government 
administration, facilitating their monitoring role on governments. In turn, this further assists the checks-and-balances 
mechanism of legislatures (Banks and Weingast 1992), again leading to smaller governments. Finally, more efficient 
production of public goods and more effective administrative processes may reduce the price of public goods. A 
reduction in tax price may increase the demand for governments’ production of public goods and possibly lead to 
the expansion of governments. These contrasting arguments pose us a significant challenge in predicting how IT 
affects the size of governments. Instead of making a specific prediction, therefore, I offer two competing hypotheses 
that greater use of IT and digitization by governments either expands or shrinks government expenditures. 
Next, adopting the state government growth model proposed by Garand (1988, 1989) as the empirical framework, I 
examine the effects of IT investments in the context of U.S. state governments. I utilize data from a variety of 
sources. I obtained the 5-year data on IT expenditures and organizations in state governments from the NASCIO 
Compendium of Digital Governments in the States. I also gathered data on state expenditure, tax revenue, payroll 
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and so forth from the U.S. Census Bureau. The primary independent variable in the empirical analyses is IT intensity 
(Bharawaj et al. 1999, Anderson et al. 2006), which is measured in two ways – the ratio of IT budget to state gross 
domestic product (GDP), and per capita IT budget. I choose the proportion of annual expenditures to state GDP, one 
of the common measures of government size in the public economics literature (e.g. Lowery and Berry 1983, 
Borcherding 1985, Saunders 1993), as a dependent variable. I build a 5-year unbalance panel consisting of 190 
observations in 44 states. The empirical model based on the state government growth model (Garand 1988) is 
estimated using the dynamic panel data estimation technique developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). 
This work contributes to the IS and public economics literature by suggesting a new technological factor for 
government expenditures. This study is also among few studies that examine the relationship between IT spending 
and organization size, especially at the organizational level, compared to industry-level studies (Brynjolfsson et al. 
1994, Woods et al. 2008). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The subsequent section offers the theoretical discussion and 
develops the hypotheses. The third section describes data sources, measures, and methodology. Next, the results 
from empirical investigations are presented. The paper concludes with discussions, limitations, and future research 
directions. 
Theoretical Development 
This section provides the theoretical arguments regarding the relationship between IT investments and government 
size. I draw on three theoretical models on government size from the public economy and political science literature 
to derive the hypotheses. 
The Production of Public Goods with Legislative Facilitation Model (Fiorina and Noll 1978) 
Fiorina and Noll (1978) provide a public good production model1 that incorporates bureaucracy costs and legislative 
facilitation services. In their model, to request the production of public goods that they desire, citizens may incur an 
external cost in dealing with government officials, and this external cost can be reduced by legislators who offer 
facilitation services. Among such external costs are those associated with discovering the appropriate entry point to 
a government agency, with communicating with the agency, and with sending the information on the public good 
demand to the agency officials. In facilitation services, legislators provide constituents with a support in dealing 
with the bureaucracy2. 
In the formal model, there are m districts, each of which n voters reside in. Each district is represented by a legislator. 
A voter is endowed with income yij ( 1,...,i n= , 1,...,j m= ). She consumes the private good zij and the public good K 
produced by a government agency. Her utility function is given by ( , )ij ijU z K . She pays a tax tij and incurs the 
external bureaucracy cost ( , )ijC B F , where B is the size of the agency and Fij indicates the amount of facilitation 
services offered by the legislator who represents the district j. C is increasing in B and decreasing in Fij. Thus, the 
voter’s budget constraint is given by, 
  ( , )ij ij ij ijy z t C B F= + +        (Eq. 1)  
The production of public good K requires two inputs – the agency B and other inputs X. The prices of the two inputs 
are PB and PX, respectively, and the production function is given by ( , )f B X . The purchase of the two inputs is 
appropriated to by tax revenue. In addition, part of the tax revenue is spent in generating facilitation services, whose 
price is Pf. Therefore, the tax revenue must be equivalent to the sum of the purchase of inputs and facilitation 
services as follows. 
                                                            
1 Here, a public good refers to a good or service produced by a government agency that every citizen consumes to 
the same extent. Examples include public safety, transportation infrastructure, and parks and recreation. Such a 
public good has characteristics of non-rivalry and non-excludability, so that the private sector has little incentive to 
produce the good and thereby the public sector becomes in charge of production. 
2 Fiorina and Noll (1978) state that “the oversight function of the legislature give it (the legislature) influence with 
bureaucrats and information on how the bureaucracy works, both of which are potentially of value to citizens who 








ij B X f ij
i j i j
t P B P B P F= + +∑ ∑       (Eq. 2)  
Fiorina and Noll (1978) solve three maximization problems in their work, depending on who a decision maker is – a 
social welfare maximization problem; a decentralization decision problem which maximizes the median voter’s 
welfare3; and a budget maximization problem in which bureaucrats are interested in maximizing budget. For 
example, the social welfare maximization problem is given by 
  max 
,
( , )ij ij
i j
U z K∑        (Eq. 3)  
  subject to ( , )K f B X=        (Eq. 4)  
       
, , , ,
( , )ij ij ij B X f ij
i j i j i j i j
y z C B F P B P X P F= + + + +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑    (Eq. 5)  
With respect to the effects of IT in the context of the above problem, some implications can be derived. First, as 
predicted by the literature of IT business value, the use of IT will improve the productivity of public good 
production. This implies that given the amount of public goods K to be produced, the use of inputs B and X can be 
reduced. Thus, as long as K remains unchanged, the budget size B XP B P X+  may decrease in IT investments.  
Second, the use of IT and the Internet may decrease the bureaucracy cost C. An example is TampaGov Customer 
Service Center in Tampa, Florida (Cantler 2007). This Web site provides citizens with a one-point contact point to 
city-wide agencies and departments. Among other tools, it features a communication tool for submitting service 
requests and inquiries, a self-service payment system for utility and tax, and a self-service public records search tool. 
Each inquiry or request submitted to the system is automatically re-directed to city officials who are in charge of it, 
and a requestor can track the progress of processing with a unique tracking number on this site. This example 
illustrates that automated administrative processes and online communication with citizens assist constituents in 
dealing with the agencies. Consequently, IT investments may lead to a reduction in C, which in turn may increase 
the citizens’ willingness to pay (tij) for the public goods. Therefore, a reduction in C may lead to an increase in the 
budget size B XP B P X+ . 
Political Control of Bureaucracy Model (Banks 1989) 
Banks (1989) proposes a political control model of bureaucracy in the presence of information asymmetry and 
conflicts of interests. His work models a budget decision game between a legislature and a bureaucratic agency. The 
legislature has an authority to approve the budget proposed by the agency, but has limited information on the actual 
cost of administration. The agency is interested in maximizing the budget size (b), while the legislature’s interest is 
to maximize the benefit to voters net of the budget ( v b− ). 
In his model, the benefit of a certain public good is v and is known to both the legislature and the agency. On the 
other hand, the cost of production c is known only to the agency. The legislature is only aware of the distribution of 
the cost, ( )f c . The budget decision game proceeds as follows. Discovering the true cost c, the agency submits a 
budget request b to the legislature. The legislature has three options. With a probability of α1, it accepts this budget 
request. With a probability of α2, it conducts an audit with cost of k and discovers the true value of c. The budget 
size becomes c after the audit. With a probability of 1 21 α α− − , the legislature rejects the budget request. Banks 
(1989) derives the sequential equilibrium strategies of the legislature and the agency as follows. 
 If *k k< , where k* is the solution of 
0 0
( ) ( )
v v
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      (Eq. 7)  
                                                            
3 Median voter theory dictates that when political inclination of voters can be described by a horizontal line and two 
political parties compete for political support, a median voter, who resides in the center of the horizontal line, is a 
decisive voter. This implies that the demand of such a median voter becomes a representative demand for a whole 
constituency. 
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According to this equilibrium, the auditing is too costly (if *k k> ), the legislature has no incentive to audit the 
budget request and thus accepts any budget request. Also, if *k k<  and c is sufficiently low ( 'c c< ), the agency 
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Based on this model, a prediction can be made regarding the impact of IT investments on the expenditure size. First, 
automation and digitization by IT systems in production processes brings a reduction in the production cost c. 
Second, even though the legislature cannot observe the true cost c, it can still expect the cost reduction. Therefore, 
the legislature’s prior cost distribution ( )f c  is shifted to the left. This shift in turn increases both k* and c’, so that 
the auditing becomes more feasible (Eq. 6), and the agency’s budget request is more likely to reveal the true cost c 
(Eq. 7). Third, digitized administration processes can collect most information regarding costs and decision making, 
enabling the legislature to conduct an audit with a less cost. Thus, IT investments may lead to a smaller k. All these 
three effects contribute to a decrease in the expected budget ( , , )B v c k . 
Continuing his work, Banks and Weingast (1992) explain the role of constituency and pressure groups in this model. 
They argue that “politicians cannot hope to monitor hundreds of agencies by themselves and instead rely on their 
constituents to do so” (p. 519). Thus, constituents who are organized and informed about agencies’ administration 
can contribute to a reduction in the auditing cost k by “conveying relevant information to politicians” (p. 519). Once 
again, digitized administrative processes can facilitate constituency’s monitoring activities, leading to a reduction in 
k and thereby the budget size ( , , )B v c k . For instance, the National Taxpayers Union was able to discover 
illegitimate expenditures in State of Missouri agencies via the Missouri Accountability Portal 
(http://mapyourtaxes.mo.gov) (Government Technology 2008a). This Web site publishes comprehensive financial 
records of the state agencies on a daily basis. This database helps both citizens and the legislatures to monitor 
bureaucrats’ activities and to curb their unnecessary use of tax revenue. The City of New York also operates a 
similar Web site called NYCStat (http://www.nyc.gov/html/ops/nycstat/) that posts a variety of information related 
to city-wide services, including city agency performance records and customer satisfaction reports (Public CIO 
2009).  
In sum, the model of Banks (1999) provides a prediction that more IT investments in governments are associated 
with a smaller size of government expenditures. 
Pressure Group Competition Model (Becker 1983) 
Becker (1983) presents a model of competition among pressure groups for political influence. He asserts that 
“individuals belong to particular groups that are assumed to use political influence to enhance the well-being of their 




6      Thirty First International Conference on Information Systems, St. Louis 2010  
 
of taxes, subsidies and other political factors.” (p. 372) In this regard, he models how political influences4 exercised 
by pressure groups determine the size of income redistribution, one of the primary role of governments (Stiglitz 
2000) and how group size and efficiency of influence activities affect on the size of redistribution. 
His analytic model considers two pressure groups – taxpayers (t) and recipients (s). The population of two groups is 
nt and ns, respectively. Each taxpayer pays Rt, while each recipient receives a subsidy of Rs. The total size of subsidy 
is governed by the following function. 
( ) ( )t t s sn F R S n G R= =        (Eq. 12)  
Here, F represents a tax collection function. In the model, ( )t tF R R≤ , ' 1F ≤ , and '' 0F ≤ , indicating the presence 
of deadweight costs in tax collection. By the same token, G refers to a redistribution function, and ( )s sG R R≥ , 
' 1G ≥ , and '' 0G ≥ , again representing the deadweight costs in distribution. The two pressure groups exercise 
political influence It and Is, respectively, and both Rt and Rs are functions of It and Is. In turn, It and Is are determined 
by the size of corresponding groups (nt and ns) and the amount of resources (money, time, and other efforts) each 
group spends in galvanizing political influences. Becker (1983) solves the optimal amount of resources each group 
spends in producing political influence and finds that the political effectiveness of a group is determined by its 
relative efficiency in organizing pressures and controlling free-riding. 
Another key finding of his model is that an increase in deadweight costs reduces the equilibrium subsidy (S) 
(Proposition 2 in p. 381). Here, an increase in deadweight costs is represented by a decrease in F’ or a reduction in 
G’. When it comes to IT investments, this finding implies that enhanced, streamlined processes in tax collection or 
subsidy payment resulting from the use of IT reduce deadweight costs in tax collection and subsidy distribution and 
thus expand the size of subsidy. For instance, at the distribution side, some U.S. states such as California and 
Tennessee are using IT systems to reduce illegitimate Medicaid payments (Government Technology 2008). 
Software such as data mining and analytic solutions is adopted in detecting fraudulent or unnecessary payment cases. 
At the tax collection side, Franklin County, Ohio, adopts address verification software to reduce the number of 
undelivered tax bills, collecting millions of unpaid taxes (Government Technology 2010). Therefore, the model of 
Becker (1983) provides a prediction that government IT investments lead to an expansion of government 
expenditures.  
The Relationship between IT Investments and Government Size 
The discussions above have suggested mixed relationships between IT investments and government size, as 
summarized in Table 1. According to the model of Banks (1989), government size is negatively related to IT 
investments, while Becker (1983) illustrates a positive impact of IT. The model of Fiorina and Noll (1978) implies 
the presence of both effects. In sum, greater IT investments may enhance the productivity of public good production 
and make the monitoring activities of citizens and legislatures less costly, leading to a smaller government. At the 
same time, enhanced efficiency and effectiveness of administrative processes imply that the price of public goods 
decreases, and thus the demand for public goods may become greater, as long as the price elasticity of demand for 
public goods is positive. This raises a possibility that IT investments are associated with a bigger government.  
Thus, rather than making a specific prediction, I offer the two competing hypotheses and try to investigate which 
effect prevails in the context of U.S. state governments. 
Hypothesis 1A: Greater IT investments made by governments are associated with smaller government expenditures. 
Hypothesis 1B: Greater IT investments made by governments are associated with bigger government expenditures. 
                                                            
4 Political influences can take various forms such as campaign contributions, voluntaries in campaigns, or political 
advertising. 
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Table 1. Summary of Theoretical Arguments 




Automated administrative processes improve the 
productivity of production of public goods and services. 
Negative Fiorina and Noll 
(1978), Banks (1989) 
Greater use of IT facilitates the monitoring role of 
legislatures. 
Negative Banks (1989) 
Demand-Side Explanation 
Citizens are more-informed via e-Governments initiatives 
and more engaged in monitoring administration.  
Negative Banks (1989), Banks 
and Weingast (1992) 
More efficient production of public goods increases the 
demand for the public goods. 
Positive Fiorina and Noll 
(1978), Becker (1983) 
 
 
Table 2. Variables 
Variable Description Theory Sources 
Dependent Variable 
GOVSIZEt State general expenditure divided by state gross domestic product (GDP) (%)  U.S. Census 
Bureau 
IT Intensity Variables 
IT1 Per capita IT budget of a central IT organization ($) NASCIO 
IT2 IT budget divided by state general expenditure (%) 
Control Variables 
GOVSIZEt-1 Lagged measure of government size U.S. Census 
Bureau 
 
INCOME State median household income ($thousand) Wagner’s Law 
POPUL State total population (in millions) 




CORPTAX Total state corporate income taxes divided by total state 
revenue (%) 
COMPLEX Herfindahl index of revenue concentration 
DEBT Mean debt level per capita ($thousand) 
FEDGRANT Per capita federal intergovernmental-in-aid ($thousand) 
GOVERNOR 1 = Republican governor, 0 = otherwise Party Control National 
Conference of 
State Legislature 
LEGIS The sum of the proportion of Republican lawmakers in 
state senate and house of representatives 
GOVEMP Total number of state and local government employees 
divided by state population (%) 
Bureau Voting U.S. Census 
Bureau 
PROGBUD 1 = state adopts program budgeting; 0 = otherwise  NASBO 
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Empirical Models 
I adopt the state government growth model proposed by Garand (1988, 1989) as a basis for the empirical analyses. 
Table 2 describes the variables and data sources. The detailed description of some of the variables is available in 
Appendix. 
The measure of government size is the ratio of state government expenditures to state GDP. In measuring 
government size, I follow Garand (1988) by using different price deflators for government size and GDP. Public 
economists argue that due to inherent inefficiencies in the public sector, government expenditures may increase to a 
greater extent than private sector spending does (Larkey et al. 1981). Garand (1988, p. 842) states that “if inflation 
rate is higher in the public sector, … the share of total economic output going to the governmental sector will 
increase even if the scope of government activity remains constant.” In order to account for this variance, 
government expenditures and state GDP are adjusted to 2005 dollar with different price deflators. The size of state 








= ,      (Eq. 13)  
where EXPENDt is state general expenditures in year t, and GDPDEFt and SLDEFt are the implicit price deflators 
for GDP and government purchases, respectively. State expenditure data are acquired from annual State 
Government Finance surveys published by the U.S. Central Bureau. I obtain the state GDP and the price deflators 
from the Bureau of Economic Accounts. 
 
Table 3. States in the Sample 
Region Division States 
Northeast 
New England Maine(4), New Hampshire(5), Vermont(3), Massachusetts(5), Rhode Island(5), Connecticut(3) 
Mid-Atlantic New York(5), Pennsylvania(2), New Jersey(3) 
Midwest 
East North Central Wisconsin(4), Michigan(5), Indiana(3), Ohio(5) 
West North Central Missouri(5), North Dakota(5), South Dakota(5), Kansas(5), Minnesota(5), Iowa(5) 
South 
South Atlantic Maryland(5), Virginia(3), West Virginia(2), North Carolina(5), South Carolina(3), Georgia(5), Florida(2) 
East South Central Kentucky(5), Tennessee(5), Mississippi(5), Alabama(5) 
West South Central Oklahoma(2), Texas(5), Arkansas(5) 
West 
Mountain Idaho(5), Montana(5), Wyoming(5), Nevada(5), Utah(5), Arizona(5), New Mexico(5) 
Pacific Washington(5), Oregon(3), California(3), Hawaii(5) 
The number in parentheses next to a state is the number of years that the state appears in the sample.  
Geographic region and division is from 2000 U.S. Census.
 
I acquired IT investments and IT management information from the NASCIO Compendium of Digital Governments 
in States published in 2003 and 2005. IT intensity (Bharawaj et al. 1999, Anderson et al. 2006), the key independent 
variable, is measured in two ways – per capita budget of a central IT organization (IT1) and the ratio of the budget to 
state GDP (IT2). By a central IT organization, I mean a central IT office, division, or department which a state CIO 
directly oversees. The NASCIO Compendium provides the IT budget figures in 193 state-years from 2001 to 20055. 
I find, however, that the State of Delaware reports an unusually high figure of IT budget (greater than 6σ above 
mean) for the fiscal years of 2003-2005. Considering these influential observations, I drop them in the estimations6. 
                                                            
5 The NASCIO Compendium also reports the IT budget figures of executive branches, but I do not include them as 
there are many missing figures for executive branch IT budgets. 
6 In estimation with including Delaware in the estimations, the coefficients of IT intensity are significant at the 10%-
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This results in a 5-year unbalanced panel with 190 observations from 44 states. Table 3 shows the list of states and 
the number of appearances in my dataset. t-tests do not reject the hypotheses that states in the sample and those that 
are not do not differ significantly with respect to population, GDP, and total expenditures. 
Garand (1988, 1989) lists several explanatory variables for state government size (Table 2). First, Wagner’s Law 
(Lybeck 1988, Gemmell 1993) suggests that government size is a function of industrialization, economic affluence 
and population growth. To account for this effect, Garand chooses income and population as explanatory variables. 
The sign of these variables is expected to be positive. Second, the fiscal illusion hypothesis suggests that certain tax 
and finance systems may in effect hide the costs of public good production. This leads taxpayers to underestimate 
the true prices and thus to demand more production of public goods than they would if they are aware of true prices. 
Such a tax system includes withholding provisions (personal income tax), indirect taxes (corporate income taxes), 
and complex tax systems. Also, a large level of debt service and intergovernmental grants from the federal 
government may also contribute to fiscal illusion (Grossman et al. 1999, Geys 2006). I control for five variables of 
tax and fiscal systems in the estimations as shown in Table 2. I expect that the sign of INDTAX, CORPTAX, DEBT, 
and FEDGRANT is positive, while that of COMPLEX is negative, as a high Herfindahl index indicates a simple tax 
system. 
Third, the party control explanation implies that “government growth is systematically related to control of 
governmental policy-making institutions by the liberal party within the state political system” (Garand 1988, p. 839). 
This suggests that a political control by the Democratic Party is related to greater growth of government. I control 
for two variables that represent the political control in state governments and legislatures. Fourth, government 
expenditures are also largely determined by the influence of pressure groups as Becker (1983) explains. One of such 
a pressure group is government employees, who as voters may demand an increase in government spending in order 
to expand their power and to ensure their job security. Following this bureau voting hypothesis, I include the ratio of 
state and local government employees to state population as a control variable. According to this hypothesis, the 
more population is employed by governments, the greater government expenditure is likely to be. Lastly, though not 
included in Garand (1988) model, budgeting processes may affect the size of government expenditure. According to 
the National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO), two budgeting processes are most widely used – 
program budgeting and incremental budgeting (NASBO 2002). The former refers to a budgeting based on program 
goals and objectives, and the latter is based on incremental changes in budgets from previous fiscal years and 
appropriation trends. I include two dummy variables for budgeting processes. I obtained state budgeting information 
from Budgeting Process in States published by NASBO. 
The following equation shows the complete empirical model. 
GOVSIZEi,t = α + β1 GOVSIZEi,t-1 + β2 INCOMEi,t + β3 POPULi,t + β4 INDTAXi,t + β5 CORPTAXi,t + β6 
COMPLEXi,t + β7 DEBTi,t + β8 FEDGRANTi,t + β9 GOVERNORi,t + β10 LEGISi,t + β11 EMPi,t + β12 
IT_INTENSITYi,t-2 + vi + εi,t        (Eq. 14) 
where i and t represents a state, year, respectively, and IT_INTENSITY = IT1 or IT2. Also vi and εi,t are terms for 
state-specific unobserved heterogeneity and idiosyncratic errors, respectively. I choose a two-year lag of IT intensity 
measure, as the impact of IT investments is not likely to materialize immediately due to organizational learning and 
adjustment effects (Brynjolfsson 1993). I however estimate the models with different lag lengths, and the main 
results do not change considerably. 
Table 4 and 5 provide summary statistics and correlations between variables, respectively. 
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Table 4. Summary Statistics 
Variables Avg. Std. Dev. Min. Max.
GOVSIZE Government Size 11.4532 2.6126 6.7524 18.7217
INCOME Income 46.5584 7.1084 32.6138 65.7097
POPUL Population 5.7770 6.2498 0.4994 35.9903
INDTAX Personal Tax 2.5173 1.6694 0 10.0801
CORPTAX Corporate Tax 14.7870 8.8417 0 32.1842
COMPLEX Tax Complexity 0.4160 0.1089 0.2260 0.7320
DEBT Debt 2.3357 1.7655 0.0062 9.6415
FEDGRANT Federal Grant 1.4389 0.4993 0.6866 4.0388
GOVERNOR Governor 0.5421 0.4995 0 1
LEGIS Legislature 0.9937 0.3229 0.2438 1.6143
GOVEMP Employee 1.7518 0.5964 1.0375 4.6325
PROGBUD Program Budgeting 0.8316 0.3752 0 1
INCBUD Incremental Budgeting 0.6842 0.4661 0 1
IT1 IT1 21.3060 19.0304 0.0438 92.8539
IT2 IT2 0.0495 0.0449 0.0001 0.2203
N = 190; Fiscal year 2003-2007 with a two-year lag of IT intensity (2001-2005). 
 
As government size may be affected by state-specific unobserved heterogenity (vi) that may be correlated with 
explanatory variables, I estimate the above model with the fixed-effect estimation. However, the fixed-effect 
estimation does not address the bias due to a correlation between vi and the lagged measure of government size 
(GOVSIZEt-1) (Kiviet 1995, Bond 2002). Hence, Eq. 14 has to be estimated by a dynamic panel data model 
(Roodman 2006). Specifically, I also adopt a two-step System Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) estimation 
outlined by Arellano and Bover (1995) and developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). I choose a System GMM 
approach over a Difference GMM model (Arellano and Bond 1991) because the former does not drop the first-year 
of observations. Therefore, a System GMM estimation increases a degree of freedom in the estimations. Following 
the suggestion of Roodman (2006), I include year dummies in Eq. 14 to ensure that there is no autocorrelation 
between idiosyncratic disturbances. In addition, to address the issue of a large number of instruments, I follow 
Roodman (2009) by including only the first three lags of government size as instruments.  
Results 
Table 6 presents the estimation results of Eq. 14 with fixed-effects (Columns 1-3) and System GMM models 
(Columns 4-6). Columns 1 and 4 show the estimation without IT intensity variables for the nine-year observations 
from 2000 to 2008. Comparing Column 1 and 4, I find that System GMM estimation changes the sign and 
significance of some coefficients, implying the present of biases in fixed-effects estimation. Thus, I consider System 
GMM estimation as the baseline estimation for interpretations. The coefficient of income (Column 4) suggests that 
contrary to the theoretic prediction in Garand (1988), the higher median household income is, the smaller state 
government expenditures becomes. This result can be explained by the theory of Meltzer and Richard (1981). Based 
on the median-voter theory, their theoretical model posits that as the ratio of mean income to median income 
increases, government spending expands as well. This is because a decisive voter with the median income demands 
more income redistribution as the voter’s income decreases. Meltzer and Richard (1983) provide empirical support 
to this proposition, and it appears that my estimation does as well.  
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Table 5. Correlation Table (N = 190) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
GOVSIZE (1) 1           
INCOME (2) -0.3626 1          
POPUL (3) -0.3666 0.0663 1         
INDTAX (4) -0.0802 0.2405 0.0752 1        
CORPTAX (5) -0.0242 0.2456 0.1217 0.2233 1       
COMPLEX (6) -0.4388 -0.0349 0.1498 -0.452 -0.4464 1      
DEBT (7) 0.141 0.3298 -0.1339 0.3834 0.242 -0.2136 1     
FEDGRANT (8) 0.5498 -0.2902 -0.1948 -0.2481 -0.262 -0.2394 0.063 1    
GOVERNOR (9) 0.011 0.1322 0.0129 -0.2063 0.0073 0.156 0.0498 -0.0669 1   
LEGIS (10) -0.2309 -0.1361 -0.0085 -0.0595 -0.2924 0.0609 -0.386 0.0244 -0.1062 1  
GOVEMP (11) 0.5439 0.0463 -0.4656 -0.2238 -0.0887 -0.1491 0.1068 0.3731 0.1253 -0.2472 1 
PROGBUD (12) -0.0042 -0.0533 0.0876 -0.0906 0.1247 0.0309 -0.0238 0.0653 0.1227 -0.0739 0.016 1
INCBUD (13) 0.2649 -0.1306 -0.1251 0.102 -0.2432 -0.1274 0.0107 0.3196 -0.0789 0.0812 0.2761 -0.0334  1
IT1 (14) 0.0012 -0.1264 -0.2734 -0.1369 -0.1793 -0.0312 0.0555 0.3169 0.0962 0.2636 0.1864 -0.0335 0.1865 1
IT2 (15) 0.0784 -0.2181 -0.2829 -0.133 -0.1711 -0.062 0.0126 0.2804 0.1227 0.2393 0.1849 -0.0352 0.1849 0.9792 1
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Regarding fiscal illusion hypotheses, as expected, the coefficient of tax complexity is negative and significant. Since 
a smaller Herfindahl index represents a more complex tax system, it appears that states with more complex tax 
systems demonstrate greater expenditure figures. Column 4 shows that a high federal grant level accelerates the 
expansion of government expenditures. 
The estimations with IT intensity variables in Table 6 show a negative relationship between IT intensity and state 
government size. Even though the coefficients of two IT intensity variables in fixed-effect regressions (Columns 2 
and 3) are found to be insignificant, these become statistically significant at the 1% level in the System GMM 
estimations (Columns 5, 6). From the coefficient of IT1 in Column 5, I calculate that a $1 increase in per capita IT 
budget is associated with a $3.88 reduction in per capita general expenditures7.  
This result shows that greater IT investments are associated with smaller government expenditures, providing 
support to Hypothesis 1A. This finding suggests that in the context of U.S. state governments, the effect of improved 
productivity and effective bureaucracy control overwhelms the opposite effect of increasing demands for public 
services. To put it differently, my estimations with a two-year lag of IT intensity indicate that productivity 
improvement resulting from IT investments is realized in a relatively short period of time, but such improvement 
appears not to lead to an immediate increase in the demand for government services. When the lag length is varied 
from no lag to a three-year lag in the estimations (Table 7), the coefficients of IT intensity (IT1) with the System 
GMM model are consistently negative at the 10% level of significance, offering further support to Hypothesis 1A. 
The validity of assumptions for System GMM estimation is tested with the approach of Levine et al. (2000). Hansen 
(1982) J test in Columns 4 and 5 of Table 6 show that the null hypotheses of over-identifying restrictions cannot be 
rejected with 16 degrees of freedom, indicating that the instrumental variables are exogenous. In addition, Arelleno 
and Bond (1991) tests do not reveal the presence of second-order correlations in differenced error terms. 
In order to further check the robustness of the main result, I adopt alternative measures for state government size to 
estimate the effect of IT intensity. As Table 8 demonstrates, I use three different dependent variables for government 
size – per capita general expenditures, general expenditures per state employee, and the ratio of GDP of general 
expenditures net of current operation expenses and capital outlays. Table 8 reveals that a higher IT intensity is 
associated with smaller per capita government expenditures (Column 1 and 2) as well as with smaller expenditures 
per state employee (Column 3 and 4). IT intensity is also negatively associated with the size of expenditures that do 
not account for current operation expense including payroll and capital outlay (Column 5 and 6), suggesting that IT 
investments may reduce not only cost components of expenditures but also other components such as 
intergovernmental expenditures or direct subsidies. 
The size of government expenditure may depend on other demographic and socioeconomic factors that are not 
accounted for in Eq. 14. Given that a major portion of state government expenditures are devoted to primary and 
secondary education and public welfare programs such as Medicaid, I include additional control variables such as 
the proportion of the elderly population, that of under 18, and poverty level. Including these variables does not 
change the main result significantly. In addition, some of the control variables may not be necessarily exogenous. 
For instance, state government employment or debt level may be influenced by the size of expenditures, possibly 
causing a simultaneity bias. I re-estimated Eq. 14 with System GMM assuming that GOVEMP and DEBT are 
endogenous. The coefficients of IT intensity are still negative and statistically significant. 
Taken together, my empirical analyses provide preliminary evidence that IT investments are associated with a 
productivity improvement in the production of public goods and a reduction in the monitoring cost incurred by 
legislatures and voters, resulting in smaller governments.  
                                                            
7 In the dataset, the average per capita state GDP is $39,202.56. $3.88 is derived from $39.202.56 × 0.000099 (the 
coefficient of IT2 in Table 6, Column 5. 
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Table 6. Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable – State General Expenditures / State GDP 
Method Fixed Effects Estimation Two-Step System GMM Estimation 


























































































































































(0.0044)   
-0.0099*** 
(0.0024)  
IT2   
-1.4365 
















N 450 1) 190 190 450 1) 190 190 





Within R2  0.5672 0.5143 0.5121    
# of Instr. 
Variables    54 35 35 
Hansen Test3)    0.450 0.201 0.211 
Serial Corr. 
Test 4)    0.139 0.228 0.223 
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01; standard errors are in parentheses; year dummies are omitted  
In System GMM estimation (Column 4-6), only the first three lags are used for instruments. 
Fiscal year 2003-2007 with a two-year lag of IT intensity (2001-2005). 1) 2000-2008; 2) Wald statistics;  
3) p-value. The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are exogenous.; 
4) p-value. Arellano-Bond test for AR(2). The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression 
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Table 7. Estimation Results with Different Lag Lengths 
Dependent Variable – State General Expenditures / State GDP 
Method – Two-Step System GMM Estimation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 

























































































































































































































































































0.260 0.263 0.904 0.818 0.228 0.223 0.202 0.180 
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01; N = 190; standard errors are in parentheses; year dummies are omitted  
In System GMM estimation, only the first three lags are used for instruments; # of instruments = 35 
1) p-value. The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are exogenous.; 
2) p-value. Arellano-Bond test for AR(2). The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression 
exhibit no second-order serial correlation. 
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Table 8. Estimation Results with Different Measures of Government Size 
Method – Two-Step System GMM Estimation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Per Capita General 
Expenditures (thousand $) 
General Expenditures Per 
State Employee (thousand $) 
The Ratio to GDP of General 
Expenditures net of Current 























































































































































































*** 21107.35*** 18118.08*** 20181.17*** 28963.94*** 32513.92*** 
Hansen Test1) 0.164 0.155 0.089 0.091 0.044 0.053 
Serial Corr. 
Test 2) 0.210 0.211 0.194 0.198 0.047 0.043 
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01; N = 190; standard errors are in parentheses; year dummies are omitted  
In System GMM estimation, only the first three lags are used for instruments. 
Fiscal year 2003-2007 with a two-year lag of IT intensity (2001-2005);  # of instrumental variables = 35 
1) p-value. The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are exogenous.; 
2) p-value. Arellano-Bond test for AR(2). The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression 
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Conclusion 
Motivated by the fact that government growth is a persistent, prevalent phenomenon in many industrialized nations 
(Saunders 1993), I investigate whether and how IT investments affect this trend. Based on the literature on public 
good production, bureaucracy, and public choices, I theorize the relationship between IT investments and 
government size.  
The empirical analysis confirms the hypothesis that more IT investments in state governments are associated with 
smaller government size. Estimations with the dynamic panel-data model provided by Blundell and Bond (1998) 
find a negative relationship between IT intensity and state government expenditures at the 1%-level of significance. 
Specifically, the result shows that a $1 increase in per capita IT budget is associated with a $3.88 reduction in per 
capita general expenditures. I also find that this result is robust to the use of different measures for government size 
such as per capita general expenditures, and the ratio to GDP of expenditures net of current operation expenses and 
capital outlays. 
Not only is this study one of the first studies on IT investments in governments, but it contributes to the literature by 
proposing a new perspective in IT value studies. To the best of my knowledge, few studies, if any, have examined 
the performance effect of IT investments in the public sector. In addition, not only is my study one of the few studies 
that investigate the impact of IT on organization size in the public sector, but it also identifies this impact with an 
organizational-level analysis, compared to industry-level studies including Brynjolfsson et al. (1994) and Wood et al. 
(2008).  
The present study is not without limitations. First, on the theoretical side, the use of the theoretical models in the 
second section may not fully explain every aspect of government expenditures. I will further review the literature on 
government expenditures and attempt to build an integrative model that theorizes the effect of IT investments in 
government size. Second, on the empirical side, even though I consciously select control variables that may 
influence the size of state governments and an appropriate estimation technique, there must be other unaccounted 
factors in my estimations, which may cause the results to be biased or inconsistent. I will report further sensitivity 
analyses in future works. 
As this is one of the early studies on the IT value in the public sector, there are numerous opportunities for future 
research. The present study discovers that IT investments reduce the size of government expenditures, but it is 
unclear whether such a reduction comes from decreasing or deteriorating public services such as education or 
infrastructure. An unanswered question thus is whether IT assets in governments generate value by improving the 
quality of public services. Researchers may study the relationship between IT investments and such quality 
measures for public services such as educational achievement, public safety, or healthcare quality. I expect that this 
study sparks interest on IT value in the public sector among IS scholars. 
This study measures a relatively short-term effect of IT spending on government expenditures, which turns out to be 
negative. Future studies may investigate a long-term effect on government size. It may be the case that in the long-
run, an improvement in efficiency and productivity of government production that is driven by greater IT use indeed 
increases the demand for public services. It would therefore be interesting to investigate how the short-term and the 
long-term influence of IT investments differ in the public sector. 
Further, researchers may study the incentives of IT investments in governments. One might wonder why 
governments invest in IT at the apparent absence of profit-seeking motivation and competitive pressures. As I find, 
IT investments lead to smaller government, an effect that is in contrast to bureaucrats’ interests, according to the 
bureaucracy theory. Which factors motivate government officials to spend part of their budget in IT? Future research 
can explore this research issue. 
Another venue for further studies is to find the contextual effect of IT investments and government size. Specifically, 
I am interested in investigating the moderating effect of IT governance. A number of studies in the IS literature have 
investigated the antecedents of IT governance structure in for-profit firms (Brown and Magill 1994, Sambamurthy 
and Zmud 1999), but the performance effect of IT governance mechanisms, on the other hand, has not been fully 
studied in the IS literature. I will hypothesize the moderating effect of IT governance by expanding the theoretical 
discussions above. In particular, I am interested in the role of legislatures and bureaucrats in IT management and 
how the involvement of legislatures and senior officials in state governments shape the relationship between IT 
investments and government size. 
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Appendix – Description of Measures  
IT Intensity (IT1 and IT2) 
2002 NASCIO Compendium of Digital Governments in States provides the actual IT budget figure in fiscal year 
2001 and 2002, and the expected budget in 2003. 2004-05 Compendium covers the actual budget in 2003 and 2004, 
and the expected budget in 2005. I take the IT budgets in 2001 and 2002 from the 2002 Compendium and 2004 and 
2005 budgets from the 2004-05 Compendium. For the IT budget in 2003, I first take the actual 2003 budget from the 
2004-05 Compendium. Second, if the actual 2003 budget is missing in the 2004-05 Compendium, I take the 
expected budget from the 2002 Compendium. For example, New Hampshire does not report its 2003 IT budget in 
2004-05 Compendium. So I take its estimated 2003 budget from the 2002 Compendium. The correlation between 
the expected 2003 budget in the 2003 Compendium and the actual budget in 2004-05 Compendium is 0.66. 
IT1 is calculated by dividing IT budget by population estimate. IT2 is derived by dividing IT budget by state gross 
domestic product provided by Bureau of Economic Accounts. 
Tax Complexity (COMPLEX) 
I calculated a Herfindahl index of seven tax categories – personal income tax, corporate income tax, property tax, 
sales tax, license tax, severance tax on extraction of natural resources, and other taxes. Suppose that ti is the ratio of 









Mean Debt Level (DEBT) and Federal Grant (FEDGRANT) 
From State Government Finances, I take an average of the beginning- and end-level of state debt and divide it by 
state population. From State Government Finances, I take intergovernmental revenue from federal government and 
divide it by state population. 
Party Control of Legislatures (LEGIS) 
I calculated the ratio of Republican state representatives in state house and Republican state senators in senate, 
respectively and added the two. Thus, LEGIS is between 0 and 2. For Nebraska, which has a unicameral legislature, 
I multiplied the ratio of republican by two. 
Program Budgeting (PRODBUD) and Incremental Budgeting (INCBUD) 
State budgeting process information is obtained from Budgeting Processes in the States published by the National 
Association of State Budget Officers in 2002 (page 45) and 2008 (page 51). Budgeting information from 2002 
version is coded for observations from 2001 to 2006, and information from 2008 version is coded for observations 
from 2007 to 2008. 
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